North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, an asymmetric energy reality for Europe

The debate around the Eastern Mediterranean often oscillates between ambitious political expectations and the more modest reality of its energy fundamentals. When examined through a technical and infrastructural lens, the region still resembles an emerging gas province rather than a mature supplier comparable to North Africa. Complex geology, high development costs, limited infrastructure and the absence of an industrial ecosystem continue to shape its trajectory.

In recent years, discoveries in Israel, Cyprus and the deep offshore of Egypt have revived European interest, nurturing the perception of a new Mediterranean energy pole. Yet this renewed attention risks obscuring the structural constraints that persist. Production in deep water remains expensive, infrastructure is fragmented, and the region relies almost entirely on Egypt’s LNG system, the only operational hub, which itself depends on Israeli gas inflows. No direct pipeline links the basin to Europe, and the EastMed project still faces significant financial and diplomatic uncertainty.

Beyond these upstream and midstream limitations lies a broader industrial gap. The Eastern Mediterranean has not yet developed capabilities in key transition technologies such as hard‑carbon pyrolysis, sodium‑battery anode materials, or critical‑metal recovery. Europe, meanwhile, increasingly requires precisely these technologies to stabilise hybrid energy systems that combine hydrocarbons with solar and wind. Without such industrial depth, the region remains confined to a narrow gas‑centric model while European needs evolve rapidly. A look at Europe’s actual gas‑flow architecture further highlights the asymmetry. Today, Mediterranean supply to the EU is structured around three major south–north corridors:

- The Italian axis, the backbone of the system, integrating Algerian and Libyan pipelines (TransMed and Greenstream) with multiple LNG terminals before channelling volumes northwards through TAG and TENP.

- The Croatian axis, built around the Krk FSRU, which has quickly become strategic by enabling LNG from the US, Qatar, Egypt and occasionally the Eastern Mediterranean to reach Central Europe.

- The Greek axis, combining Revithoussa LNG, the Alexandroupolis FSRU and pipeline flows from Turkey via TAP and TANAP, supplying Bulgaria, Romania and the Western Balkans.

These corridors form the operational skeleton of Europe’s Mediterranean gas system — and the Eastern Mediterranean does not directly feed any of them. Its contribution remains indirect, primarily through Egyptian LNG or potential future interconnections whose timelines and viability remain uncertain. North Africa, by contrast, maintains a stable, structural presence: Algeria, Egypt and Libya constitute a mature energy triangle with substantial reserves, decades of operational experience and direct links to Europe. Following 2022, the EU,  and Italy in particular,  naturally leaned on these suppliers to offset declining Russian volumes. North Africa already provides 10–15% of European gas imports and could reach 15–20% by 2030.

The Eastern Mediterranean’s footprint is far smaller. It represents less than 3% of EU imports today, and even optimistic scenarios do not exceed 3–5% by the end of the decade. Its significance is therefore more geopolitical than volumetric. Persistent maritime disputes, regional tensions and unresolved borders further complicate long‑term planning.

A pragmatic European strategy must acknowledge these asymmetries. North Africa will remain the primary southern pillar of Mediterranean supply and requires targeted investment in pipelines, upstream development and long‑term contractual frameworks. The Eastern Mediterranean, meanwhile, is best integrated through Egyptian LNG in the near term, while receiving support to build the industrial capabilities it currently lacks. Only by developing these technologies can the region move beyond a gas‑only model and contribute more meaningfully to Europe’s evolving energy landscape.

NAFTEMPORIKI  / OPINIONS, Sunday, February 1st, 2026

Βόρεια Αφρική και Ανατολική Μεσόγειος, μια ασύμμετρη ενεργειακή πραγματικότητα για την Ευρώπη