Southern Europe at a crossroads: pipelines, LNG, and the new supply architecture in the Balkans
A fragmented approach, without connection to TAP, Neptun Deep, Central European flows, and the future potential of Greece and Libya, creates technical and regulatory incompatibilities that limit the strategic role of the easternmost vertical natural gas corridor. Its fragmented approach, without connection to TAP, Neptun Deep, Central European flows, and the future potential of Greece and Libya, creates technical and regulatory incompatibilities that limit its strategic role. However, the available data and failed market tests provide a clear picture of the scale of the expenditure, the structural obstacles, and the conditions required for the corridor to become truly strategic.
Europe is in a period where economic logic and geopolitical reality are colliding. The confrontation between LNG and pipelines is now palpable, with a direct impact on the cost and stability of supply. In this environment, Alexandroupolis can only function as one of the gateways of a multi-source system that includes TAP, Neptun Deep, Central European flows, and the future potential of Greece and Libya. Only within this framework can investments in new compressors, pressure upgrades, and full bidirectional operation to Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine be justified.
The first axis is the expansion of TAP, which operates at 10 Bcm per year and is designed to reach 20 Bcm. The first stage, to be completed in 2026, adds 1.2 Bcm, while the full upgrade can be completed in 3–4 years from the investment decision. The technical maturity of TAP makes it the fastest reinforcement of non-LNG flows to Europe, provided there is a political signal that Caspian gas remains strategic after 2030.
The second axis is Romania's Neptun Deep, the largest offshore natural gas project within the EU. With a cost of €4–5 billion and first gas in 2027, it will produce approximately 8 Bcm per year. As an intra-European source with full institutional control, it can supply Bulgaria, Hungary, and Central Europe, reducing the need for LNG, provided there is regulatory harmonization in the Vertical Corridors.
The third axis is North Africa, with significant reserves and existing pipelines to Italy and Spain. After upgrades, it could offer 70–77 Bcm per year to Europe, with Algeria at 60–65 Bcm and Libya at 10–12 Bcm. These flows strengthen Central Europe and allow greater flexibility in flows from the Caspian and Black Seas to Southeast Europe. Despite the geopolitical risk, the region remains critical to European balance.
The fourth axis is the Alexandroupolis gasification station, with a capacity of 6 Bcm per year and a cost of approximately €650 million. The station enhances the flexibility of the system and complements pipeline flows.
In the medium term, Greece could add 5–10 Bcm per year from potential reserves south of Crete, while corresponding volumes of 5–10 Bcm could come from Libya, provided that the appropriate infrastructure is developed. All these sources are only valuable if they can be effectively channelled to Central and Eastern Europe.
In this context, the single Balkan Vertical Corridor system takes on central importance. The cost of upgrades and new infrastructure for full bidirectional operation is estimated at several billion euros. New compressors, reinforcements at key points, storage upgrades, and harmonization of regulatory frameworks are required. The EU's delay in finalizing the co-financing rate is more strategic in nature, as the Union seeks to avoid a premature commitment that could be perceived as either a preference for LNG or preferential support for pipelines. The EU can cover up to 50% of eligible costs through CEF Energy and up to 75% for security of supply projects, making the venture strategically viable.
NAFTEMPORIKI / OPINIONS, Friday, February 27, 2026
Η Ν.Α. Ευρώπη σε σταυροδρόμι: αγωγοί, LNG και η νέα αρχιτεκτονική εφοδιασμού στα Βαλκάνια