Energy Education and Public Debate

Natural gas, which will remain crucial globally for years to come, is often seen as a necessary evil, but in Greece it is entirely imported, constituting a huge strategic weakness that has been exacerbated by years of political opposition to the exploitation of domestic hydrocarbons. Renewable energy sources are presented as free electricity, whilst the stability of the grid requires investment that does not feature in newspaper headlines.

The country needs a new narrative that explains why the price at the petrol station is not determined by Brent crude? Why does a surplus in the electricity trade not automatically mean a profit? Why does neighbouring Bulgaria profit by storing Greek electricity during periods of cheap overproduction, only for us to buy it back at a high price in the evening? Why are small and medium-sized enterprises excluded from major energy investments? And why is energy sovereignty not just a slogan but a technical objective?

In this new narrative, the political leadership has a responsibility to understand the system before regulating it. The media have a responsibility to inform the public by highlighting the actual technical parameters. And society has a responsibility to demand transparency, not oversimplification. Energy is not a field for easy answers; it is a field for serious thought.

Often, for the sake of making a dramatic point or due to a lack of specialist analysis, a superficial narrative is perpetuated in which price fluctuations are presented as the result of an arbitrary decision, renewable energy sources are portrayed as a source with no associated costs, interconnections as automatic solutions, and natural gas as the perennial scapegoat. This oversimplification deprives the public of a proper understanding of the issues and leads political leaders to tackle the symptoms, whilst relegating the root cause of the problem to the background: namely, that the system operates according to strict laws of physics, technical equilibrium and economic mechanisms.

Recent articles have examined the complex mechanism of Brent, the accounting surplus from electricity exports, electricity storage, the prioritisation of the Recovery Fund over commercial tenders, and the shift towards the future exploitation of domestic fossil fuels. They shared a common aim: to help people understand the reality behind the impressions. This misunderstood reality is analysed in ten points.

The first major point of misunderstanding is the order in which generation units are brought online. The final price is not an average of the units but the marginal price. The last unit needed to meet demand determines the final price. In Greece, this unit is often the natural gas-fired unit, not because gas dictates the price, but because the electricity system has limited flexibility and minimal storage capacity. Any discussion of prices cannot take place without an understanding of this phenomenon.

This misunderstanding gives rise to the second misconception: that renewables produce electricity for free. Renewables have zero marginal cost, but the system pays to integrate them. It pays for flexibility, it pays for reserve capacity, it pays for balancing, and it pays for the grids. Greece has a high penetration of renewable energy sources but lacks the mechanisms required to capitalise on their value. Consequently, the intermittency of renewable energy sources translates into flexibility costs, and it is the consumer who bears these costs.

The third point is this cost of flexibility. Flexibility is the system’s ability to increase or decrease power output rapidly. In Greece, flexibility comes almost exclusively from natural gas-fired power stations. Gas is the market’s ‘favourite’ because the country has limited hydroelectric capacity, minimal storage and high generation variability. The result is that prices rise not because of renewables, but because of the need to offset their variability. The major vertically integrated groups in the market recognised this structural reality early on. By developing portfolios comprising both renewable energy and natural gas plants, they have managed to hedge against market risks, by utilising renewable energy generation when prices are favourable and securing stable revenue from providing flexibility via gas when green generation falls short.

This brings us to the fourth point: energy storage. Storage is not a technology of the future. It is the technology of the present. Without storage, renewable energy cannot be fully utilised, volatility remains high and natural gas continues to determine the marginal price. Greece needs storage to reduce flexibility costs, increase the value of renewable energy sources and limit its dependence on expensive imported natural gas, whether liquefied or not.

The fifth point concerns interconnections, but it is rarely explained why interconnections involve costs, risks and strategic implications. Exports are not a profit but an accounting entry. Imports are not a failure but a necessity of the system. Interconnectors transmit not only energy, but also volatility, prices and congestion. Greece needs interconnectors, but it also needs a strategy for how to use them.

The sixth point is reserve capacity. Reserve capacity is the power that must be available at all times, even if it is not being used. Greece pays dearly for reserve capacity because the system has high volatility and low flexibility. Reserve capacity is not a waste. It is a prerequisite for stability.

The seventh point is the balancing market. This market is the mechanism that pays for rapid changes in power output. In Greece, the balancing market is expensive because the system is highly volatile and there are few players capable of providing flexibility. The price of balancing is often higher than the wholesale market price, and it is the consumer who bears this cost.

The eighth point is the need for SMRs. SMRs are not merely a new technology. They are a tool for flexibility, stability and independence from natural gas. Greece does not yet have a strategy for SMRs, but the debate must begin: not as an ideological confrontation, but as a technical necessity.

The ninth point is grid costs. Renewable energy sources require grids. Grids require investment. These investments do not appear in the price per MWh, but they do appear on electricity bills. Greece needs grids to integrate renewable energy sources, but it also needs a strategy for how to finance them.

The tenth point is energy education. The media and political figures, regardless of their political affiliation, often discuss energy in terms of soundbites rather than in systemic terms. However, the energy transition is in fact an energy transformation, not simply a matter of flicking a switch. And this mechanism must be understood. Energy is not merely about production. It is about balance. And balance requires knowledge.

Naftemporiki / Opinions, Sunday, August 23, 2026

https://www.naftemporiki.gr/opinion/2152587/energeiaki-paideia-kai-dimosios-dialogos/