The Great Redistribution: Who is buying Lukoil’s energy assets?
The case effectively began in late October 2025, when the company announced its intention to sell its Austrian-based subsidiary, Lukoil International GmbH. This portfolio of assets, valued at over 20 billion dollars, was put up for sale under the weight of US sanctions and pressure from European authorities, whilst the necessary approvals and final negotiations are still pending.
The focus on South-Eastern Europe and Russia’s exclusion
At the heart of this commercial and geopolitical venture lies South-Eastern Europe, centred on Bulgaria and Romania. In Bulgaria, Lukoil owned the Neftochim Burgas refinery, the largest in the Balkans, as well as the Rosenets marine terminal and a network of over 220 petrol stations. In Romania, it operated the Petrotel refinery in Ploiești, a network of 300 petrol stations and held an 80 per cent stake in the Trident offshore block in the Black Sea, whilst in Moldova it controls a significant network of petrol stations and fuel depots. For reasons of national security and security of supply, governments in the region have introduced stricter controls and appointed special state commissioners, effectively limiting the role of the Russian administration.
This development was also closely linked to the Vertical Gas Corridor. Although these are different infrastructure projects, geopolitically they represent two aspects of the same strategy to reduce dependence on Russia. The Vertical Corridor introduces new flows of non-Russian natural gas to Northern Europe, whilst the region’s energy autonomy simultaneously requires the transfer of control over critical oil infrastructure to non-Russian entities.
From a business perspective, Lukoil’s refineries are available at adjusted valuations due to the sanctions, a situation that generates investment interest but also poses significant risks. The greatest of these relates to the cost of modernisation. The transition from Russian Urals crude to alternative heavy or medium crudes from the Middle East, Kazakhstan or the United States will require extensive technical adjustments. At the same time, the new owners will have to navigate the European Union’s strict environmental framework and the increased insurance premiums for transport in the Black Sea.
At the same time, prospective buyers gain access to ready-made infrastructure, eliminate the risk of sanctions and tap into new supply chains. From Moscow’s perspective, further investment in European assets is considered increasingly unattractive. Consequently, Lukoil has opted to sell the assets as they stand and channel its liquidity into its domestic refineries in Perm, in the European part of Russia, and Volgograd, in south-eastern European Russia, or into Asian markets.
Expansion into the Adriatic and Africa
This reallocation model is already being applied in the Adriatic and North Africa. In the Western Balkans, the JANAF Adriatic Oil Pipeline, which starts at the Omišalj terminal in Croatia, has emerged as a strategic pillar for controlling regional crude oil flows. The ban on the transport of Russian crude via the network has restricted access for refineries in Serbia and Montenegro that relied on these supplies. This development is prompting the Russian company to transfer subsidiaries and networks to regional players, such as the Hungarian firm MOL, as well as to international trading houses.
In Egypt and North Africa, Lukoil held stakes in fields in the Western Desert, such as Meleiha and WEEM. The Italian company Eni, in partnership with Chevron and ExxonMobil, acquired or repurchased the Russian stakes, thereby strengthening its control over energy flows to Southern Europe via the GreenStream and TransMed systems.
At the same time, the restructuring of Lukoil’s portfolio extends to the South Caucasus. The company retains a stake in the giant Shah Deniz natural gas field in Azerbaijan, one of the most important sources supplying the Southern Gas Corridor to Europe via the TAP pipeline. Although these specific holdings are not currently the focus of the sales, they highlight the breadth of the company’s international energy footprint and the strategic importance of the assets that could potentially change hands in the future.
The Involvement of European Groups and the True Cost
The new investment landscape is being shaped by the involvement of European and international groups. France’s TotalEnergies is acquiring 100 per cent of the Zeeland refinery in the Netherlands, whilst Eni and MOL are strengthening their position in the wider region. At the same time, international trading companies such as Trafigura and Vitol, as well as state-owned Gulf conglomerates such as ADNOC, are vying for or taking over critical segments of the production and supply chain.
The sanctions have created the conditions for the transfer of this infrastructure to new investors, both European and international. Consequently, part of the energy sector remains or is returning to European hands, albeit amidst a period of profound restructuring.
However, the change in ownership does not translate into cheaper energy. Technical upgrades to refineries, new supply chains and higher transport costs are adding several billion euros in costs at European level. The new energy architecture strengthens security of supply, but not necessarily cost competitiveness.
Fuel prices and inflationary pressures are likely to remain higher than pre-crisis levels, which highlights a fundamental reality: Europe’s new energy architecture strengthens security of supply, but does not guarantee lower energy costs for European citizens.
Naftemporiki / Opinions, Wednesday, October 14, 2026